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Alternative Methods of Appeal From
Decisions of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ADDISO1 E. DEWEY*
The One Hundredth General Assembly has provided an al-
ternative method of appealing from decisions of the Ohio Board
of Tax Appeals. Amended House Bill No. 220, which became ef-
fective October 2, 1953, amends Section 5717.04 (5611-2), Revised
Code, to grant an alternative appeal from decisions of the Board of
Tax Appeals to the Supreme Court or to the court of appeals for
the county in which the property taxed is situate or in which
the taxpayer resides.
With respect to a corporate taxpayer, the bill provides that
the appeal from the Board is to the Supreme Court or to the court
of appeals for the county in which the property taxed is located,
or the county of residence of the agent for service of process, tax
notices or demands, or the county in which the corporation has
its principal place of business. In all other instances, the proceed-
ing to obtain such reversal, vacation or modification shall be by
appeal to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
The direct appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals which was in effect from 1941 until the ef-
fective date of Amended House Bill No. 220, was a controversial
provision. Criticism of the direct appeal to the Supreme Court
was often made because of the sundry tax cases which were ap-
pealed to the Court. On occasion, mention was made in a
judicial opinion that many of the tax cases appealed to the Supreme
Court presented primarily questions of fact.1 Disapproval was also
voiced because the direct appeal forced the taxpayer to the ex-
pense of presenting his case to the Supreme Court. Agitation for
a change of the direct appeal provision was reflected by the intro-
ducing in the Ninety-ninth General Assembly of House Bill No.
384, which would have amended Section 5611-2, General Code, to
provide that proceedings to obtain reversal, vacation or modifi-
cation of the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals should be by
appeal to the court of appeals for the county in which the property
taxed is situated, or in which the taxpayer resided. This legislation
was not enacted.
Apparently, the One Hundredth General Assembly felt that
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I Mead Corporation v. Glander, 153 Ohio St. 539, 93 N. E. 2d 19 (1950).
At page 539, the Court stated: "This is another of the cases coming from
the Board of Tax Appeals in which, under existing statutes, this court is
called up to assume the role of a second administrative board of review and is
required to pass largely on questions of fact."
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the importance of tax cases justified the retention of the direct
appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Board of Tax
Appeals, but that the taxpayer should be given a choice between
an appeal to the Supreme Court or to an appropriate court of ap-
peals. The provisions of Section 5717.04 Revised Code, in contrast
with former Section 5611-2, General Code, permit a taxpayer to
obtain judicial review of his tax case nearer his residence or center
of business operations, for the alternative appeal may be taken to
the court of appeals for the county in which the property taxed is
situate or in which the taxpayer resides. For a corporate taxpayer,
the appeal may be taken to the court of appeals in the county
where the property taxed is situate, or the county of residence of
the process agent, or the county in which the corporation has
its principal place of business.
The evolution of judicial review of tax assessments in Ohio
has taken the following pattern. Prior to 1939 the tax determina-
tions of the then Tax Commission were appealable to the various
common pleas courts.2 From 1910 to 1939, the Ohio tax laws were
administered by a Tax Commission which consisted for a time of
three members and later four members. In 1939, the Tax Commis-
sion was abolished by the General Assembly and there was created
the present Department of Taxation composed of a single Tax
Commissioner and a three-member Board of Tax Appeals. All
of the functions, powers, and duties which the law vested in the
old Tax Commission were transferred to the Department of Taxa-
tion. However, the General Assembly separated the administra-
tive and quasi-judicial functions by providing that final determina-
tions of the Tax Commissioner were to be reviewed by the Board
of Tax Appeals. Final determinations of the Tax Commissioner
were made appealable first to the Board of Tax Appeals and then,
as of right, directly to the Supreme Court of Ohio.3
The provision for an alternative appeal from decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals, either to an appropriate court of appeals
or to the Supreme Court, presented certain problems in the draft-
ing of Amended House Bill No. 220. One possible complication
with respect to the alternative appeal method was created because
of the conceivable situation where the taxpayer or other specified
person4 would choose one method of appeal initially and then dur-
ing the thirty-day appeal period change his mind and follow the
alternative method. Then, too, the question *arose as to what the
situation would be when either the Tax Commissioner or the tax-
payer decided to file a cross appeal. Many times in tax cases there
2Section 5611-2, General Code, as amended in 116 Ohio Law 123.
3 Oio Gnu. CODE, §§ 5611, 5611-1, and 5611-2.
4 Oaro Rv. CoDE, § 5717.04.
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are various points at issue in the litigation. The taxpayer may
appeal from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals on some
issue or issues decided adversely to him and the Tax Commissioner
may file a cross appeal on issues resolved in favor of the taxpayer.5
In other instances the cross appeal has been taken by the taxpayer.6
In order to obviate these complications referred to, the Senate
Judiciary Committee 7 amended the bill 8 by setting forth the tradi-
tional principle that the court in which notice of appeal is first filed
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal. Another amend-
ment made by the Senate Judiciary Committee was necessitated
because of the use of the term "taxpayer" in Amended House Bill
No. 220. Since the bill refers to the term "taxpayer" in prescribing
in what appropriate court of appeals the appeal may be brought
if the taxpayer or other proper person desires not to appeal direct-
ly to the Supreme Court, the question was raised as to whether
such term was adequately inclusive.
Section 5711.01 (5366), Revised Code, provides that the term
"taxpayer" excludes all financial institutions, dealers in intangibles
or public utilities as so defined in Title LVII, Revised Code, except
to the extent they may be required to file returns as fiduciaries.
Hence, in order to insure that financial institutions, dealers in in-
tangibles and public utilities were included within the term "tax-
payer" for appeal purposes, the Senate Judiciary Committee pro-
vided that any person required to return any property for taxation
was a taxpayer under Section 5717.04, Revised Code.
Identical procedural requirements are set forth in Amended
House Bill No. 220 for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals either to the appropriate court of appeals
or to the Supreme Court. The procedural requisites of Section
5717.04, Revised Code, are jurisdictional, for the Supreme Court
has held that where a statute confers the right of appeal, adherence
to the conditions thereby imposed is essential to the enjoyment
of the right conferred. 9
The General Assembly, in enacting Amended House Bill No.
220, prudently provided that the scope of judicial review of de-
cisions of the Board of Tax Appeals would be the same whether
the appeal was taken to a court of appeals or directly to the Su-
preme Court. In this respect, the bill provides:
If upon hearing and consideration of such record and evi-
5 Fyr-Fyter Co. v. Glander, 150 Ohio St. 118, 80 N. E. 2d 776 (1948).
6 C. F. Kettering, Inc., v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 356, 98 N. E. 2d 793 (1951).
7 Senate Journal, p. 4, May 28, 1953.
8 Amended House Bill No. 220.
9 American Restaurant & Lunch Co. v. Evatt, 147 Ohio St. 147, 70 N. E.
2d 93 (1946). See also Oliver v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 231, 58 N. E. 2d 381 (1944);
Kenny v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 369, 59 N. E. 2d 47 (1945).
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dence the court decides that the decision of the board ap-
pealed from is reasonable and lawful it shall affirm the
same, but if the court decides that such decision of the
board is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse
and vacate the decision or modify it and enter final judg-
ment in accordance with such modification.,
Prior to the enactment of Amended House Bill No. 220, Section
5611-2, General Code, provided, and the Supreme Court so inter-
preted the statute to mean, that the court could reverse, vacate, or
modify the decision of the Board only when the court was of 1he
opinion that such decision was unreasonable or unlawful.10 It would
seem that the One Hundredth General Assembly, as well as past
General Assemblies, has felt that only a limited judicial review
of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals is necessary because of the
provision in Section 5717.02 (5611), Revised Code, for a de novo
hearing before the Board. The Supreme Court held that a full ad-
ministrative appeal from an order of the Tax Commissioner to the
Board of Appeals was contemplated by Sections 5611 and 5611-1,
General Code." The court has further announced that the rule
usually applied by the courts that the action of a public officer
within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by law is presumed to
be valid and in good faith, is not applicable in an appeal from the
Tax Commissioner to the Board of Tax Appeals.1 2 The Supreme
Court has also held that, although the Board of Tax Appeals exer-
cises quasi-judicial functions, it is an administrative body.'3
Because of the provisions of the statute,1 4 which, prior to the
enactment of Amended House Bill No. 220, provided that the Su-
preme Court could reverse the Board of Tax Appeals only if the
Court found such decision unreasonable or unlawful, the Supreme
Court has taken the view that the General Assembly intended to
import good faith and verity to the decisions of the Board of Tax
Appeals.'0 The provision, therefore, in Amended House Bill No. 220,
for a limited judicial review of decisions of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals by either the appropriate court of appeals or the Supreme
Court, is consistent with prior legislative provision and judicial
interpretation thereof. Thus, the General Assembly has provided
for the same type or scope of judicial review irrespective of wheth-
er the appeal is taken directly to the Supreme Court or in the
alternative to an appropriate court of appeals.
If the taxpayer or any other proper party chooses to appeal to
10 Clark v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 229, 85 N. E. 2d 291 (1949).
11 Bloch v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 381, 86 N. E. 2d 318 (1949).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Oio G=r. CODE, § 5611-2.
IS Bloch v. Glander, supra, note 11.
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an appropriate court of appeals, any further appeal to the Supreme
Court will be on questions of law only. Amended House Bill No.
220 provides that any party to the appeal shall have the right to
appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals on questions of
law, as in other cases. If the alternative method of appealing to the
appropriate court of appeals from a decision of the Board is chosen,
the appellant may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from the
decision of the court of appeals only in accordance with Section
2505.28 (12223-28, Revised Code. Section 2505.29 (12223-29), Re-
vised Code, provides that, except as to the judgment or final order
of the court of appeals, or a judge thereof, in cases involving ques-
tions under the Constitution of the United States, or of this state,
and in cases which originated in the court of appeals and except
as to proceedings of administrative officers as may be provided by
law, no appeal shall be filed in the Supreme Court in cases over
which it has jurisdiction without its leave, or that of a judge there-
of. Undoubtedly the provisions of Section 2505.29, Revised Code,
which require leave of the Supreme Court to appeal from a de-
cision of the appropriate court of appeals except in certain cases,
will be given due consideration before the taxpayer or any proper
party decides to appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals to an appropriate court of appeals, rather than to the Supreme
Court as of right.
An interesting aspect of the alternative appeals now provided
from decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals relates to cases involv-
ing questions under the Ohio Constitution. The application for
exemption of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 6 is
illustrative of the situation where cases involving constitutional
questions are appealed directly to the Supreme Court from a de-
cision of the Board of Tax Appeals. In that case, the Court was
confronted with the question as to whether Sections 5356 and 1078-
36, General Code, declaring property of housing authorities to be
public property and exempt from taxation, were violative of Sec-
tion 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution. In a per curiam opin-
ion, it was stated that although a majority of the members of the
Court were of the opinion that Sections 5356 and 1078-36, General
Code, were unconstitutional, two members of the Court did not
concur in that view. The property in question was held to be ex-
empt from taxation under the referred to statutory provisions, be-
cause five members of the Supreme Court may not declare a
statute unconstitutional since Section 2, Article IV of the Consti-
tution provides no law shall be held unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the
judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of a court of ap-
16155 Ohio St. 590, 99 N. E. 2d 761 (1951).
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peals declaring a law unconstitutional and void.
Thus, when a direct appeal is taken to the Supreme Court from
a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals involving a constitutional
question, a statute may not be declared unconstitutional without
the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges of the Supreme
Court. If, however, the appeal from a decision of the Board is taken
to the appropriate court of appeals and such court declares a
statute unconstitutional, then in the appeal as of right to the Su-
preme Court from the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court may, by a majority of its members,17 affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals declaring the law unconstitutional and void.
When the constitutionality of a statute is upheld by a court of
appeals, six judges of the Supreme Court are required to hold the
law violative of the Constitution.'8
17 OHIo CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2, also provides in part that: "Whenever the
judges of the supreme court shall be equally divided in opinion as to the
merits of any case before them anl are unable for that reason to agree up-
on a judgment that fact shall be entered upon the record and such entry
shall be held to constitute an affirmance of the judgment of the court below."
I8 Barker v. Akron, 98 Ohio St. 446, 121 N. E. 646 (1918).
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